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Introduction
This paper originates from a naïve question: why vertical differentiation models generally assume either a variable cost or a fixed one but, as far as we know, never both? Indeed, models in the line with Mussa and Rosen (1978) , Gal-Or (1983) , Champsaur and Rochet (1989) and Cremer and Thisse (1994) suppose the development of new quality generates variable costs, whereas those in the line with Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983) assume that research and development of a new product induces fixed cost. All the same, the improvement of product quality may involve fixed and variable costs. For instance, the development of an automobile model by a car manufacturer or the rise in computer capability, according to the Moore's law, require not only research and development (R&D) fixed costs but also production variable costs.
Obviously, the introduction of a fixed production cost in a model with variable quality cost would not change firms' quality choice. However, would the introduction of a production unit cost in models with fixed quality cost modify firms' quality choice and therefore price choice? Motta (1993) argues that the constant unit production cost can be neglected. In fact, this assumption enables him to strongly simplify the analytical resolution of the game: This is the first answer to our naïve question. But is it really without influences on the firms' choices? Our paper shows that it is not really the case: Thanks to an original analysis methodology, we also achieve to show that the unit production cost plays a specific role in the game by creating an upgrading effect that raises the prices of both products in the same proportion and allows several consumers to substitute the high quality for the low one. As a result, a low unit cost tends to reduce product differentiation and thus prices, whereas a high unit cost leads to widen product differentiation and to increase prices.
The model
We consider a differentiated market in which consumers differ in their willingness-topay for the best quality of the product. Each consumer buys one unit of the product or none. 1 There are only two identical firms in the industry. Each firm produces one variant of the product and decides on its price.
There is a continuum of consumers whose marginal willingness-to-pay for quality, denoted is uniformly distributed over , [ ] with a unit density function. When the consumer purchases the quality q i at price p i , he derives an indirect utility u( ) = q i p i . Thereby, the consumer ˜ = p l q l is indifferent between consuming the low quality product q l at price p l or none of the products. The consumer
is indifferent between consuming the low quality q l at price p l or the high quality q h at price p h (with q h q l 0). As usual with such a model, we assume that the market is not covered ( <˜ ), so that the demand for low quality product is d l =ˆ ˜ and the demand for high quality product is d h = ˆ .
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In the duopoly, each firm i offers one quality q i and faces a R&D cost c q i ( ) that enables the provision of this quality. The quality cost is a standard quadratic function c q i
(with f 0). Furthermore, firms incur the same unit cost v ( v 0). Their profits are thus given by:
The competition between firms takes place in a two-stage game. In the first stage, they decide on the quality q i to produce. In the second stage, firms choose prices p i .
The game Equilibrium
The game is solved by backward induction in order to provide the subgame perfect equilibrium. In the second stage, firms choose their price taking as fixed qualities q h and q l . The maximization of their profits (1) with respect to prices induces the following equilibrium prices:
The corresponding demand functions are:
The unit cost v tends to increase prices and then to depress demand. The demand for the lowest quality product remains thus positive as long as v is sufficiently low in comparison with the willingness-to-pay of the consumer for the lowest quality q l :
In the first stage, firms choose quality specification q h * and q l * maximizing their profits, according to the following first order conditions: 2
In order to simplify these conditions, we operate a first variable substitution by denoting q h * q l * (with 1). Both conditions (5) induce the following equality:
When v = 0, it induces, as in Motta (1993) 
and the equilibrium high quality is defined by q h * = ( ) q l * .
4 Calculations and simulations were made with the software Mathematica. We cannot express straightforwardly the form of this root.
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The function ( ) slightly increases up to 0.06 ( ) = 0.049 before decreasing to zero for = 0.5 (cf. graph 1b). When = 0, the game solution corresponds to the Motta's quality equilibrium without unit cost. The game equilibrium formulation set out in the proposition 2 allows us to sharpen the effects of key parameters of the game on firms' choices, particularly the production unit cost.
The effects of variable cost introduction
In order to analyse the effects of the existence of a production unit cost, we examine the game equilibrium for different values of v and draw a parallel between these simulations and the analytical expression of the equilibrium (see appendix A2 for a simulation exemple). We restrict here the study to the duopoly case. According to the graph 2a, a unit cost lower than 0.003 tends to improve the low quality until q l * = 0.049 whereas a higher unit cost reduces it. That is in the line with the shape of ( ) which reaches its maximum for = 0.06, such as 0.06 ( ) = 0.049 . Furthermore, the unit cost tends to downgrade the high quality. This effect arises from its contradictory impact on q l * and ( ) . The latter decreases for Moreover, the unit cost weighs on prices, through its direct effect on production cost and its indirect impact on product differentiation, beyond the threshold 0.07 (graph 2b). A higher unit cost also leads to a loss in demand addressed to each firm (graph 2c).
Noticeably, profit of both firms decreases with the unit cost, in such a way as a high unit cost implies a high quality monopoly (graph2d).
The effects of the production unit cost may also be resume in the proposition below. Furthermore, equations (8) and (9) enable us to give some analysis elements for other key parameters of the firms' choice. In order to carry out this study, we present below an illustration of the game equilibrium with a unit cost v = 0.1 q l * . Following the equation (8), the differentiation parameter is here 0.1 ( ) = 5.2015 and the equilibrium is characterized by:
According to (10), the fixed cost parameter f tends to decrease product differentiation ( q h * q l * = 0.207 2 f ) and prices, through deterioration of the quality of both products. Demand for each variant is independent of f which doesn't affect the quality-adjusted prices p i * q i * . Obviously, the more the maximal marginal willingness-to-pay is high, the more qualities, prices and profits are great.
Conclusion
The introduction of a positive unit production cost in a vertical differentiation model with fixed cost for quality improvement is not neutral. Thanks to an original analysis method of the game equilibrium, we highlight that a low unit cost tends to reduce product differentiation and thus prices, whereas a high unit cost leads to raise product differentiation and prices. Furthermore, a high unit cost may lead to a high quality monopoly. ( )
because the first term is positive and the term in brackets is negative, and
The second equation of (5) is increasing for low values of q l and decreasing for larger values of q l . The second derivative of firm l's profit is: 
